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Abstract: The idea of higher wealth taxes to finance the mounting public debt in the wake of 
the financial crises is gaining ground in several OECD countries. We evaluate the revenue 
and distributional effects of a one-time capital levy on personal net wealth that is currently on 
the German political agenda. We use survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP) and estimate the net wealth distribution at the very top, based on publicly available 
information about very rich Germans. Since net wealth is strongly concentrated, the capital 
levy could raise substantial revenue, even if relatively high personal allowances are granted. 
We also analyze the compliance and administrative costs of the capital levy. 
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1  Introduction 
The hurricane of the financial crisis is leaving behind public budgets in a state of disorder. 
Public debt ballooned in several European Union nations as well as in the United States. In 
some of these countries the ratio of public debt to national income is rapidly becoming haz-
ardous to fiscal sustainability. Even in Germany, which was hit less hard by bank collapses 
and recovered quickly from the sharp recession, the ratio of public debt to GDP reached 87 
percent at the end of 2010, representing an increase of more than 20 percentage points from 
where it was prior to the crisis. As in most other countries, budget consolidation will be on 
top of the fiscal policy agenda in Germany over the years to come, calling for spending cuts 
and tax increases. Since the distribution of income and wealth became more uneven in most 
advanced economies over the last decades, taxing the “rich” is back on the policy agenda 
again. 
In Germany, a one-time capital levy is proposed in the political debate in order to refinance 
the sharp increase in public debt caused by the financial crisis. The levy is to be imposed on 
personal net wealth, i.e., assets minus liabilities. To concentrate the tax burden on the wealthy 
part of the population, higher personal allowances are proposed. Compared to conventional 
recurrent taxes on higher income and wealth, the one-time levy is to be imposed on the exist-
ing stock of wealth, thereby offering little room for immediate tax avoidance strategies. Still, 
there are income and wealth effects, and the introduction of a capital levy might change ex-
pectations of wealthy people concerning future fiscal policy. 
In this study, we evaluate the revenue and distributional effects of a capital levy as proposed, 
inter alia, by Green Party representatives in the German federal parliament.
1 This proposal 
aims at raising tax revenues in the amount of Euro 100 billion from a capital levy, which 
equals the increase in public debt directly caused by the financial crisis since the end of 2007. 
We use survey data on households’ net wealth stocks from the 2007 wave of the German So-
cio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and microsimulation modeling to determine the impact of the 
capital levy on tax revenue and wealth distribution. Since survey data do not represent the 
high end of wealth distribution well, we include information from a listing of the 300 richest 
Germans, provided by the business periodical manager magazin. Using Pareto distribution, 
                                                 
1   Our study is based on a research project on behalf of the Green parliamentary group in the German federal 
parliament (for the detailed final report, see Bach et al., 2010).   3
we estimate the wealth distribution of persons with a net wealth of more than Euro 2 million 
and impute this distribution into our micro data base by adjusting survey weights accordingly. 
The resulting aggregates on assets and liabilities are consistent with the stocks reported in the 
national and financial accounts statistics.  
Since net wealth is strongly concentrated at the top of the distribution, a capital levy could 
raise substantial revenue, even if relatively high personal allowances are granted, thus restrict-
ing the number affected to a very small percentage of all taxpayers. Assuming a personal al-
lowance of Euro 250,000 we estimate a tax base of Euro 2,950 billion amounting to 118 per-
cent of GDP in 2010. A capital levy raising tax revenue in the amount of Euro 100 billion, or 
4 percent of GDP, would thus require a tax rate of 3.4 percent. We also analyze alternative 
scenarios of a capital levy yielding the same tax revenue with a narrower tax base, and a cor-
respondingly higher tax rate. In the case of a personal allowance of Euro 1 million, which 
would confine the capital levy to the richest 0.6 percent of the population, the required tax 
rate would be 5.3 percent. We also analyze the compliance and administrative costs of the 
capital levy.  
We proceed as follows: In section 2, we discuss the capital levy proposal against the back-
ground of recent fiscal policy challenges and historical experience. Section 3 describes the 
data on household wealth including the imputation of wealth at the top of the distribution. The 
microsimulation model used to assess the impact of the capital levy on tax revenues, implied 
tax rates and the wealth distribution is described in section 4. Section 5 presents the main 
results of the study, and section 6 concludes. 
2  A Capital Levy on Personal Net Wealth 
The financial crisis and the subsequent world-wide recession drove public budgets into heavy 
imbalances. Excessive leveraging in parts of the private sector brought financial markets close 
to collapse and had to be replaced with public debt and central bank liquidity. Large economic 
stimulus programs were launched to fight the recession. In most advanced economies, budget 
deficits exploded and public debt rapidly increased (Figure 1). Compared to 2007, the debt-to-
GDP ratio for the entire OECD ballooned by 25 percentage points, reaching a level greater 
than 100 percent in 2011. Debt ratios will increase further since most of the countries contin-
ue to run high structural deficits. In particular, the US and UK face large increases in public 
debt ratios, and they are still running high public deficits. Germany and the overall Euro zone   4
will get out of the crisis in relatively good shape, although Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain were hit very hard. 
Figure 1 General government financial balances and liabilities 
in selected OECD countries, 2005-2012 
as per cent of nominal GDP 
    * 2011-2012: Forecast. 
    Source: OECD Economic Outlook 89, May 2011.














































Historical experience and recent studies suggest that a ratio of public debt to national income 
exceeding 100 percent or more could be hazardous to long-term fiscal sustainability (Kumar 
and Woo, 2010, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010). Fiscal retrenchment is critical over the next few 
years. This requires a well-balanced mix of spending cuts and tax hikes that should seek to 
harm economic growth as little as possible. Usual topics in these debates are long-term spend-
ing cuts of subsidies and social programs, or increments in consumption taxation. However, 
tax policy increasingly envisages taxing the “rich.” People with higher income and wealth are 
suggested to bear a greater share of the tax burden. This is more so as the distribution of in-
come and wealth became more uneven in most advanced economies (for the income distribu-
tion, see OECD, 2008, Atkinson and Piketty, 2007, 2010). 
An alternative to conventional recurrent taxes on higher income and wealth is a one-time 
capital levy, which is proposed in Germany. The revenue should refinance the increase in 
public debt immediately caused by the financial crisis. Public funding for bank rescues and 
economic stimulus programs are estimated to cost at least Euro 100 billion, which equals 4 
percent of GDP (IMF, 2010: 7). We assume this amount as the revenue target for the simula-
tions on the capital levy in the following. As Figure 1 shows, the total increase in German   5
public debt, since the beginning of the crises, is five times higher, amounting to more than 20 
percentage points of GDP.  
According to the proposals made during public debate, the levy is to be imposed on personal 
net wealth, i.e., assets minus liabilities, and should include generous personal allowances in 
order to focus the tax burden on the wealthy part of the population. We operationalize these 
features of the proposals by setting the personal allowance to at least Euro 250,000, which 
would confine the tax burden to the top decile of the net wealth concentration. Furthermore, 
we analyze scenarios with higher personal allowances (Euro 500,000, Euro 1 million). In ad-
dition, parents should benefit from a child allowance for their dependent children. We assume 
a child allowance of Euro 100,000 or Euro 250,000 in case of the higher personal allowances. 
Basically, the tax base of the capital levy is rather similar to a recurrent tax on personal net 
wealth, which existed in Germany until 1997. For various details regarding tax design, as-
sessment procedures, tax administration, and tax compliance one can refer to the previously 
existing regulations. With respect to the ascertainment and appraisal of the tax base, which 
was rather contentious at that time, tax policy might rely on the new valuation procedures 
introduced for inheritance and gift taxes in 2009. Although there are no clear experiences on 
the performance of these valuation procedures so far, they aim to capture market values as 
close as possible for tax purposes. However, standardized appraisal remains an intricate issue 
(see Rudnick and Gordon, 1996). It is especially challenging to assess standard values for real 
estate properties and small firms based upon market transactions. In these cases, special valu-
ation procedures, based on standard business and real estate appraisal practices, must be im-
plemented. Moreover, financial assets are often hidden from capital income and wealth taxa-
tion in Germany due to bank secrecy regulations. This would, perhaps, require disclosure 
obligations for financial institutions, in particular, tracer notes for tax purposes, as existent for 
inheritance and gift taxation in Germany. With respect to the foreign investments of domestic 
taxpayers, some room for tax evasion will remain since international cooperation between tax 
authorities is insufficient. This is particularly true for financial investments transferred to off-
shore banking centers, but it also holds true for real estate and firm shareholdings abroad.  
Like the former wealth tax, claims to social security or private pension schemes and similar 
claims to health and unemployment insurance should be tax-exempt, as long as they do not 
exceed a certain amount. The same procedure should apply to other household effects such as 
furniture and motor vehicles. Exemptions might be adopted in the case of higher value house-
hold assets, such as expensive cars, yachts, private aircrafts, or collections of art, jewelry, etc. 
Such assets were taxed by the former German wealth tax when in excess of allowances. Lia-  6
bilities are to be deducted from the tax base as far as they refer to taxable assets. This does not 
apply to consumer credits taken out for non taxable household assets.  
Unlike the former wealth tax, the capital levy should be confined to individuals. Corporations 
are exempt since their shareholders are subject to individual taxation. This would avoid dou-
ble taxation of incorporated firms, but would also exclude foreign shareholders from taxation 
as well as domestic non-commercial institutions such as governmental bodies, religious com-
munities, associations, unions, etc. Problems might arise with respect to private family foun-
dations or trusts that are often used as holdings for larger family-owned firms. In these cases 
it may be difficult to identify the beneficiaries to whom the shares are to be assigned (for the 
UK, see the discussion in Boadway et al., 2010: 785). 
In contrast to a recurrent tax on personal net wealth, the one-time levy would be imposed on 
the existing stock of wealth. For obvious reasons, a valuation date in the recent past must be 
declared, for example January 1, 2010. As the potentially affected taxpayers did not anticipate 
the capital levy, taxpayers have no incentives for immediate tax avoidance by adjusting their 
economic behavior. Insofar, as there are no substitution effects, the levy implies no excess 
burden in terms of standard optimal taxation theory. However, there are income and wealth 
effects caused by the tax burden. And, in the long run, the question is how wealthy people 
would react to the experience of the one time levy with respect to future fiscal policy. 
As proposed, the capital levy would be charged at a flat rate, determined by the desired reve-
nue divided by the estimated tax base. A progressive tax scheme might also be possible, by 
defining brackets of taxable wealth with different tax rates, or by reducing the allowances if 
the tax base exceeds a certain amount. According to historical examples (see Eichengreen, 
1989) and the German capital levy from the fifties (see below), the payment of the levy could 
be stretched out over a longer period, for instance 10 years, with annuities of tax payments, 
using a standard interest rate for public debt. This would account for taxpayers’ liquidity con-
straints, especially in the case of business and real estate property. Even in the case of higher 
tax rates, spreading out payments over a decade would allow the levy to be paid out of current 
income rather than principal, effectively turn the levy into a recurrent tax on capital income, 
thus mitigating the income and wealth effects of the tax burden.  
Specific reliefs are proposed for business property. These should reduce the tax burden of 
small and medium sized firms in order to relieve the liquidity constraints of the annual tax 
payments in the case of a temporary decline in profits. As a separate scenario, we assume a 
rather generous allowance of Euro 5 million for the net equity of each firm. This would ex-  7
empt most small sized firms. Moreover, we restrict the annual tax payment to 35 percent of 
the annual business income, which would mitigate firms’ liquidity problems in economic 
downturns. 
Regarding the practical and political feasibility of a capital levy, Eichengreen (1989) com-
bines theoretical considerations with a historical review of attempts to introduce such a levy 
in the 20
th century. In a standard capital income taxation framework, the welfare improving 
effect of a capital levy obviously hinges on the perception of the levy’s exceptionality. If po-
tential taxpayers expect that the capital levy will be repeated, this could discourage long-term 
saving and investment, while encouraging capital flight. Eichengreen argues that even if its 
recurrence cannot be ruled out, a capital levy can be welfare improving if adopted to redress 
debt problems created by extraordinary circumstances. Historically, this was often the case 
during or after great wars. In particular, after World War I, several European countries con-
sidered capital levies, some implemented them, and, in most cases, the levies failed. Problems 
of practicability and tax enforcement arose, capital flight occurred since the political delibera-
tions caused delay, and property owners heavily resisted the levy. However, successful capital 
levies were implemented in post-World War II Japan and Germany. 
In particular, the capital levy as the principle financing source in the German “burden shar-
ing” (“Lastenausgleich”) legislation of 1952 was rather successful in raising funds for war 
indemnities and reconstruction (Wiegand, 1992). A tax rate as high as 50 percent was im-
posed on personal net wealth exceeding a personal allowance, with payments stretched out 
over 30 years. The tax burden mainly fell on real estate and business property since financial 
assets were largely devaluated by the 1948 currency reform. Ultimately the levy raised yearly 
revenues of about 1 percent of GDP at the beginning of the fifties and was helpful in funding 
reconstruction and the integration of displaced persons. This experience is present in discus-
sions on capital taxation in Germany today. 
3  Data on Household Wealth and Top Wealth Concentration 
Our analysis is mainly based on the 2007 wave of the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) 
survey. The SOEP is a representative yearly panel study of private households in Germany 
(for a detailed description, see Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005, Wagner et al., 2007). In 
2007 about 20,000 individuals living in approximately 12,000 households were interviewed. 
For each year, the survey contains detailed information on personal and household income, 
household composition (marital status, number of children) and personal characteristics of the   8
household members. The 2007 wave includes a special wealth survey that provides us with 
detailed information on the level and composition of wealth of individuals aged over 16. In 
particular, the wealth questionnaire records both the gross value of owner-occupied and rented 
property wealth, outstanding debt on these wealth components, financial and tangible assets 
as well as related debt, and the estimated value of a business or shares owned in business 
property.
2 For real estate and business property the market value as estimated by the respond-
ent is recorded.  
An important feature of the SOEP is the special high-income sample that includes about 800 
households with monthly household net incomes of at least Euro 3,850 in 2007 (see Haisken-
DeNew and Frick, 2005). Since there is a strong positive correlation between income and 
wealth, and because the capital levy analyzed here is principally targeted on the wealthy 
population, this oversampling of high-income households in SOEP waves allows us to esti-
mate wealth distribution more precisely. For aggregating the results based on SOEP data, we 
use the individual-level weights provided by the 2010 SOEP distribution (for the revised 
weighting scheme, see Kroh, 2009).  
A substantial share of respondents only report that they own certain wealth components but 
do not report the respective amounts. We impute these wealth items following the statistical 
procedure suggested by Frick et al. (2007, 2010). The procedure imputes missing values at the 
personal level, which cannot directly be inferred from valid household information on the 
basis of selectivity-corrected regression models for each wealth component. To check to what 
extent these survey data contain systematic measurement errors, we compare wealth infor-
mation derived from the SOEP wealth survey for the household sector with aggregate data 
from the national and financial accounts statistics (for details, see Bach et al., 2010). 
Given the modest size of the high-income sample and the fact that the very rich are un-
derrepresented in household surveys, household wealth at the top of the distribution cannot be 
accurately estimated on the basis of SOEP data alone. The SOEP records 75 persons who 
report net wealth of at least Euro 2 million, and 20 persons reporting at least Euro 5 million. 
While the reported net wealth of the richest person in the SOEP was less than Euro 50 million 
in 2007, it is well known that a substantial number of persons or families living in Germany 
                                                 
2   Recorded financial assets do not include the value of occupational pensions. Tangible assets do not include 
the value of household furniture and cars owned by the household. Refer to the section “Your personal assets 
and liabilities” in 2007 questionnaire wave: 
http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/diw_01.c.56579.de/personen_en_2007.pdf, pp. 30 ff.   9
have wealth exceeding this amount by a large margin. According to the yearly ranking of the 
300 richest Germans published by the business periodical manager magazin (2007), the min-
imum amount of net wealth required to make it on this list was about Euro 350 million in 
2007. We estimate the wealth distribution at the very top on the basis of this source and adjust 
the wealth distribution derived from the SOEP accordingly. 
Since we analyze the distribution of wealth at the individual level, we first equally divide the 
amount of net wealth reported on the mentioned list according to an assumed number of four 
family members as wealth is reported by family. Persons or families whose ordinary place of 
residence is known to be abroad are excluded from the sample. We assume that the manager 
magazin list includes all persons whose net wealth exceeds Euro 300 million in 2007, and that 
the distribution of net wealth exceeding this threshold can be approximated by the Pareto dis-
tribution.
3 The parameter determining this distribution (Pareto coefficient) is estimated with 
simple linear regression. For our sample and the mentioned threshold the estimated Pareto 
coefficient is 1.34, with an estimated standard error of 0.04. Using this estimate, we derive the 
number of persons with a net wealth in the range between Euro 5 to 300 million from the Pa-
reto distribution. Applying this imputation procedure we derive that about 90,000 persons 
have net wealth of at least Euro 5 million, including all cases from the manager magazin list 
of the 300 richest Germans. We integrate these cases in our data. In order to adjust the SOEP 
population weights for the imputed cases of super-rich persons, we reduce the sampling 
weights of the SOEP cases with net wealth between Euro 2 and 5 million according to the 
assumed Pareto distribution so that the required adjustment of population weights is achieved. 
The structure of wealth components for the imputed cases, in particular business property, 
real estate property and financial assets, are derived on the basis of estimated share equations 
drawn from the sub-sample of persons with net wealth of at least Euro 1 million before impu-
tation. These estimates imply that the share of business property is increasing in total net 
wealth. The remaining characteristics that are relevant for the assessment of the capital levy or 
for the distributional analysis, for instance the age or the number of children, are imputed 
using mean values from the SOEP cases representing the top 40,000 persons of the net wealth 
distribution before imputation.  
                                                 
3   For the use of the Pareto distribution in the analysis of the distribution of very high wealth see, e.g., Klass et 
al. (2006).   10
The imputation at the top of the distribution results in a substantial increase in the estimated 
amount of personal net wealth by almost Euro 1,200 billion. The resulting total amount of 
personal net wealth of Euro 7,225 billion, derived on the basis of this imputation and the 
SOEP data, is very close to the corresponding amount of Euro 7,240 billion found by the mac-
roeconomic aggregates reported in national and financial accounts statistics (see Table A-1 in 
the Appendix).
4 This substantial increase in the amount of personal net wealth is mainly due 
to the relatively large amount of business property owned by the imputed cases at the top of 
the distribution, whereas the other wealth components are slightly reduced as a result of the 
imputation and the corresponding reduction of the sampling weights of the observations with 
a net wealth below Euro 5 million, respectively (for details, see Bach et al., 2010).  
The left part of Table 1 shows the distribution of personal net wealth including imputations 
for non-response based on the SOEP data alone, while the right part also includes the imputed 
amounts of personal net wealth at the top of the distribution. Personal net wealth is highly 
concentrated even without imputing wealth at the very top of the distribution, as indicated by 
a value of the Gini-coefficient of 0.7726 reported at the bottom of the table. The breakdown 
of the wealth distribution by percentiles shows that only 2 percent of total net wealth is owned 
by the bottom-half of the distribution, whereas more than 60 percent of it is held by the top 
decile of the distribution. More than 23 percent by the top 1 percent and almost 9 percent of 
total net wealth is owned by the top 0.1 percent. The increase in the wealth concentration is 
substantial when imputed wealth at the very top of the distribution is added. The Gini coeffi-
cient jumps to 0.8097, the more top-sensitive entropy measures, in particular the GE(2) meas-
ure (which equals half the squared coefficient of variation), indicate a much stronger increase 
in wealth inequality. The share of personal net wealth owned by the top 1 percent of the dis-
tribution increases to more than a third, and the share of the top 0.1 percent nearly triples. 
This underlines the importance of imputing wealth at the very top of the distribution, which is 
usually not represented in survey data, and at the same time also indicates that estimates of 
total wealth may be sensitive to the imputation procedure. 
                                                 
4  From the total amount of net wealth reported in the national accounts we have deducted the following items 
that are not recorded in the SOEP data base (see Table A-1 in the Appendix): consumer durables, the value 
of occupational pensions and private health insurance schemes, currency and transferable bank deposits, and 
consumer loans.   11
Table 1  Distribution of personal net wealth in Germany, 2007 
Percentile Percentile
1 000 Euro bill. Euro % 1 000 Euro bill. Euro %
 1
st - 5
th decile \    103  1.7  \    103  1.4 
 6
th - 9
th decile  16  2 310  38.2   16  2 310  32.0 
 10
th decile  210  3 633  60.1   210  4 813  66.6 
\   6 045  100.0  \   7 225  100.0 
 256  3 227  53.4   256  4 408  61.0 
 492  2 046  33.9   492  3 227  44.7 
 772  1 409  23.3   772  2 590  35.8 
1  200 1  072  17.7 1  200 2  252  31.2 
4 079   520  8.6  6 080  1 627  22.5 
Gini coefficient 0.7726  0.8097 
Entropy meas.
GE(1) 1.3801 2.2201 




For information: Summary inequality measures of personal net wealth
Database SOEP including imputed 
top wealth distribution
1) Net wealth distribution of persons in households aged over 16.
Sources: German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), 2007, own calculations.
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Fractiles








Our data reflects the 2007 wealth distribution, the year of the most recent wealth survey col-
lected in the SOEP. We abstain from uprating the data base to the present. Basically, house-
hold wealth in Germany should not have changed significantly in the meantime. Although the 
financial crisis has devaluated several assets, businesses and stock markets strongly recovered 
during 2009 and 2010. Real estate markets performed rather moderately in Germany over the 
last decade and were not strongly affected by the crisis. Taking into account additional sav-
ings, household wealth stock in 2011 should be slightly higher than in 2007.  
4  Microsimulation Modeling of Personal Wealth Taxation 
Using the edited and adjusted micro data base described in the previous section, we built a 
microsimulation model of personal wealth taxation. Modeling the tax base, we start from the 
compilation of the various assets and liabilities, take into account the specific reliefs for busi-
ness property, and include personal and child allowances, for which we assume different sce-
narios. We also analyze the compliance and administrative costs of the capital levy.  
We analyze three scenarios of personal and child allowances, which represent different de-
grees of a broader or narrower tax base. In order to confine the tax base to the top decile of the 
wealth distribution, we set the personal allowance to at least Euro 250,000, and the child al-
lowance to Euro 100,000. Scenarios with higher personal allowances, respectively, Euro   12
500,000 and Euro 1 million, both combined with a child allowance of Euro 250,000, focus the 
tax burden at the very top of the wealth distribution.  
We align these scenarios to a further scenario taking into account specific reliefs for business 
property. This scenario includes an extra allowance of Euro 5 million on the net equity of 
each firm. Notably, the allowance is granted only once per firm. Therefore, we impute infor-
mation on the distribution of firm size and number of shareholders from tax statistics, in order 
to estimate the firm size of the shareholdings observed. Moreover, we restrict the annual tax 
payments to 35 percent of the annual business income, less imputed entrepreneurial profit. 
For that purpose, we edit the survey information on business income and estimate a fictitious 
wage for the self-employed, using standard wage regression models accounting for selection 
effects (for details, see Bach et al., 2010: 55).  
The child allowances can be derived using the detailed information on household composi-
tion. The entitlement to the allowance, which includes dependent adult children in education 
or severely disabled children, follows the corresponding regulations in personal income taxa-
tion. 
The tax rate of the capital levy is calculated by dividing the revenue target of Euro 100 billion 
by the estimated tax base of the respective scenarios assuming a flat rate. The payment of the 
levy is stretched out over 10 years. The yearly annuities are calculated using an interest rate of 
4.0 percent, which is derived from the longer-term average of government bonds of that ma-
turity. 
The compliance and administrative costs of wealth taxation have been rather contentious in 
policy debates (see Boadway et al., 2010, Rudnick and Gordon, 1996). In particular, the inex-
actness of real estate appraisal is considered as a main obstacle in a fundamental re-
assessment of the outdated standard values for wealth taxation in Germany. Using the detailed 
information of the micro data base we simulate the potential compliance and administrative 
costs, taking into account the incentives of taxpayers to appeal against assessments (for de-
tails, see Bach et al., 2010: 67). For the valuation of assets and assessment procedures, we 
rely on standard cost rates from the fiscal authorities and estimations on the time involved for 
compliance. With respect to the potential estimation errors of the real estate appraisal, which 
are deemed to be rather high, we use empirical information on the performance of the new 
valuation schemes used for inheritance and gift taxation. Studies show that the valuation pro-
cedures appear to be unbiased, but have a larger standard error. By imputing normally distrib-
uted error terms on the observed values in the data set, we simulate the potential estimation   13
error of the real estate appraisal. Based on this distribution, we analyze the potential for re-
monstrance against the values assessed by the fiscal authorities by simply modeling the incen-
tives of the taxpayers. Beside extra costs for the appeal procedures and certified appraisals, 
our results suggest the valuation corrections might result in a significant tax revenue shortfall. 
The owners of the noticeable overvalued properties would appeal in order to adjust the valua-
tion, whereas, no such correction would happen in the opposite direction in case of the under-
valued properties.  
Regarding the reliability of our estimations of the revenue and distributional effects presented 
in the following section 5, some caveats are in order. Our simulations mainly rely on the 
German SOEP, which is a relatively small stratified random sample of the non-institutiona-
lized population living in Germany. The 2007 wave of the SOEP includes 20,000 persons 
aged over 16 in 12,000 households. The average sampling probability is 0.03 percent, within 
the high-income sample it amounts to 0.083 percent. Given the rather small number of obser-
vations and the huge variance in the very top wealth percentiles on which the capital levy is 
concentrated, the standard error of estimations on tax base, revenue, and distribution of the 
levy is likely to be fairly large. Actually, the confidence intervals we report for the main re-
sults in the following section 5 are rather high. These are based on estimated robust standard 
errors and include the estimation errors of the imputed top wealth concentration. Given the 
high importance of imputed wealth at the top of the distribution for the tax base (see the fol-
lowing section 5), further estimation risks emerge with respect to the validity of the Pareto 
distribution and its estimation based on the listing of the top wealthiest persons. Although the 
validity of the Pareto distribution for the very top income and wealth distribution is often ap-
proved, we cannot test it for the interval between the wealthiest persons observed in the SOEP 
and the listing of the 300 wealthiest Germans. 
Further measurement errors are hard to assess given the information available. We cannot 
evaluate the self-assessed property valuations of the SOEP respondents since there is no addi-
tional information on the characteristics on the respective assets. In any case, we have no evi-
dence on a systematic bias in this respect. The point estimate on net wealth aggregates cap-
tures the aggregates from macroeconomic wealth accounts for households. However, these 
macroeconomic figures could be plagued by several estimation risks as well. Comprehensive 
information on real estate and business property derived from market transactions or financial 
accounting do not exist in Germany. Even the Bundesbank‘s macroeconomic financial ac-
counts, which are based on the banking and capital market statistics, could fall short in fully 
reporting the households’ financial investments abroad. Moreover, it remains unclear if fiscal   14
authorities would actually succeed in fully ascertaining and valuing all taxable properties. 
Thus, a significant measurement error would clearly remain. This means that our results pre-
sented in the following section should be treated with some caution.  
5  Tax Base, Tax Rate, and Distributional Effects of a Capital Levy 
The “first-round” effects of the capital levy on the tax base and the wealth distribution pre-
sented in the following do not include behavioral responses of the taxpayers to the extra tax 
burden. However, as discussed above (see section 2), a one-time levy imposed on the existing 
stock of wealth does not provide incentives for immediate adjustments in economic behavior. 
Insofar as there will be no substitution effects of the levy, only income and wealth effects, for 
instance on saving and investment. Moreover, liquidity constraints might cause financial 
troubles in the case of business and real estate property, although mitigated through tax reliefs 
and the 10 year payment period. These effects are neglected in the following. We only model 
the potential of appeal of the taxpayers against the real estate values assessed by the fiscal 
authorities, and the revenue losses incurred.  
Since net wealth is heavily concentrated at the top percentiles of the population, wealth taxa-
tion could raise substantial revenue even if relatively generous personal allowances are grant-
ed (Table 2). In the case of a personal allowance of Euro 250,000 and a child allowance of 
Euro 250,000 we estimate a tax base of Euro 2,952 billion, neglecting the allowance for busi-
ness property. This tax base amounts to 118 percent of GDP in 2010. Thus, an annual wealth 
tax at a rate of 0.5 could raise tax revenue of Euro 15 billion, or 0.6 percent of GDP. About 
4.8 million persons, or 7 percent of the population aged over 16, would be liable to the tax.  
In the case of a rather generous personal allowance of Euro 1 million, the tax base is still es-
timated at Euro 1,875 billion, or 75 percent of GDP. Thus, an annual wealth tax at a rate of 
0.5 could raise tax revenue of almost Euro 9.4 billion, or 0.4 percent of GDP. The number of 
affected taxpayers declines to 414,000 persons (0.6 percent of the population over 16). The 
specific allowance for business property clearly reduces the tax base by 21 percent for the 
lower personal allowances, and by about 25 percent for the higher allowances. 
Due to the estimation uncertainty resulting from the sampling error of SOEP data and the 
imputation of the top wealth distribution, the estimated 95 percent confidence intervals for the 
tax base are rather wide. For the lower personal allowances they amount to about +/- 30 per-
cent of the point estimate. They increase to +/- 40 percent for the high allowances.   15
Table 2  Tax base of the capital levy for alternative scenarios 
none 5 mill. Euro none 5 mill. Euro none 5 mill. Euro
2 952  2 313  2 244  1 704  1 875  1 409  7 225 
2 081  1 688  1 396  1 100  1 059   837  6 325 
3 822  2 939  3 092  2 308  2 690  1 981  8 125 
4 787  4 384  1 394  1 162   414   332 
4 451  4 065  1 194   990   320   241 
5 124  4 703  1 593  1 334   508   423 
92.3 92.3 97.7 97.7 99.4 99.4 
19.8  22.0 3.7 4.1 0.0 0.0  64.2 
25.8 22.4 25.6 21.6 17.2 12.6  13.3 
54.4 55.6 70.7 74.3 82.8 87.4  22.5 
3.6 3.5 1.7 1.3 0.5 0.4  15.5 
6.9 7.2 2.7 2.3 1.0 0.6  23.1 
6.1 5.8 2.8 2.2 0.8 0.5  12.3 
83.4 83.6 92.9 94.2 97.8 98.5  49.1 
14.6 13.4 14.6 14.0 14.9 14.4  20.2 
39.2 38.5 36.4 35.8 34.1 33.7  42.0 
46.2 48.1 48.9 50.2 51.0 51.9  37.8 
1 768  1 402  1 060   792   691   496  6 045 
1 412  1 103   736   520   401   252  5 645 
2 123  1 700  1 384  1 064   980   740  6 445 
 Sources: Simulations based on German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), 2007, adjusted for top wealth
 concentration.
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The results, shown by net wealth percentiles, underline the high wealth concentration at the 
top percentiles. In the case of the lower allowances, the top 0.1 percent wealthiest persons 
account for 55 percent of the tax base, compared to 23 percent of total net wealth. This share 
significantly increases with higher personal allowances. In the scenario with a personal allow-
ance of Euro 1 million and a child allowance of Euro 250,000, the tax burden is completely 
concentrated on the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution. In this case, the top 0.1 percent 
wealthiest persons account for 83 percent of the tax base, or 87 percent for the scenario in-
cluding the allowance for business property.   16
We further report the distribution of the tax base by net equivalent income, which is calculat-
ed based on net household income including imputed rent and weighted by the modified 
OECD equivalence scale. The concentration at the top income decile is also pronounced, but 
less than for wealth concentration. This comes from wage and transfer income, whose under-
lying implicit wealth stocks, “human capital” and “social capital”, are not or only partly in-
cluded in the tax base. 
The tax base is more heavily concentrated on older people when compared to the overall dis-
tribution of net wealth. Since these persons often no longer have children eligible for the child 
benefit, the impact of the child allowance is not so strong. A separate simulation (which is not 
provided here) shows that the tax base would increase only by 1.7 percent if we reduce the 
child benefit from Euro 250,000 to Euro 100,000 for the middle scenario of the personal al-
lowance (Euro 500,000). 
At the bottom panel of Table 2 we include information on the tax base that would result from 
calculations without imputation of the top wealth distribution. As described above, this impu-
tation has a strong effect on wealth aggregates and concentration. While the imputation in-
creases total net wealth by 20 percent, the tax base increases by 67 percent in the scenario 
with the lowest allowances. With the highest allowance, including that for business taxation, 
the tax base nearly triples. This emphasizes the importance of accounting for top wealth con-
centration in modeling the revenue and distributional effects of wealth taxation with higher 
allowances. However, this also sheds light to the relevance of estimation risks involved with 
our estimation procedure.  
The tax rate of the capital levy is calculated by dividing the targeted revenue of Euro 100 
billion by the estimated tax base of the respective scenarios (Table 3). For the scenarios in-
cluding special allowances for business property, we further restrict the annual tax payments 
to 35 percent of the annual business income. Therefore, we iteratively increase the tax rate 
until we achieve the fixed revenue target. In Table 5 we display both the entire tax rate, which 
is required to raise the revenue target of Euro 100 billion, and the annual tax rate calculated as 
annuity over 10 years with an interest rate of 4.0 percent. Due to compounded interest, the 
annual tax rate is 21 percent higher than one tenth of the tax rate for the whole 10-years’ peri-
od.   17
Table 3  Tax rate and distributional effects of the capital levy for alternative scenarios  
and a targeted tax revenue of Euro 100 billion 
none 5 mill. Euro none 5 mill. Euro none 5 mill. Euro
  Total  tax  rate  3.39% 4.41% 4.46% 5.95% 5.33% 7.18% 
4.80% 6.04% 7.16% 9.22% 9.44%  12.09% 
2.62% 3.47% 3.23% 4.39% 3.72% 5.11% 
 Annual rate, 10 years
2) 0.41% 0.53% 0.54% 0.72% 0.65% 0.87% 
0.58% 0.73% 0.87% 1.11% 1.14% 1.46% 
0.32% 0.42% 0.39% 0.53% 0.45% 0.62% 
19.8  22.1 3.7 4.1 0.0 0.0 
25.8 22.0 25.6 21.4 17.2 12.5 
54.4 55.9 70.7 74.5 82.8 87.5 
-0.31 -0.31 -0.32 -0.32 -0.33 -0.33 
-1.55 -1.70 -2.10 -2.38 -2.45 -2.80 
-4.01 -5.83 -6.12 -8.80 -7.82  -11.12 
 Costs of tax assessm. 
  as  %  of  tax  revenue  7.42% 9.00% 4.79% 5.50% 2.85% 3.24% 
   Compliance costs
4) 3.40% 3.59% 1.66% 1.58% 0.72% 0.64% 
   Administrative costs
5) 1.40% 1.36% 0.57% 0.54% 0.23% 0.20% 
2.63% 4.05% 2.56% 3.38% 1.90% 2.40% 
 Total tax rate  5.66%  7.63%  9.43%  14.85%  14.48%  26.96% 
7.08%  9.70% 13.58% 22.62% 24.94% 53.11% 
4.71%  6.29%  7.22% 11.06% 10.20% 18.07% 
 1) 95% confidence interval, robust standard errors.- 2) Annuity of the total tax liability, 4.0% interest 
 rate.- 3) Distribution of persons in households aged over 16.- 4) Compliance costs of the taxpayers.- 
 Sources: Simulations based on German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), 2007, adjusted for 
 top wealth concentration.
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The narrower the tax base is determined, the higher the tax rate must be fixed in order to real-
ize the revenue target of Euro 100 billion. However, even in the case of the rather generous 
personal allowance of Euro 1 million, which would confine the capital levy to the richest 0.6 
percent of the population, the annual tax rates still might be deemed as rather modest, as it 
amounts to 0.65 percent, or 0.87 percent in the case of the special reliefs for business proper-
ty. This result again underlines the high wealth concentration. Yet, the estimation risks are 
rather high, in particular for the scenarios with the high allowances. Looking at the upper 
bound of the confidence interval the respective annual tax rate ranges at 1.14, or 1.46 percent.   18
Notably, the confidence intervals estimated for the tax rates are not symmetrically distributed 
around the point estimate since the tax rate is determined for the fixed revenue target Euro 
100 billion, which is divided by the respective tax base. 
The distribution of the tax burden by net wealth closely corresponds to the distribution of the 
tax base presented in Table 2. In the case with specific reliefs for business property the tax 
burden is concentrated somewhat more heavily at the top percentiles. This results from re-
stricting the annual tax payments to 35 percent of the annual business income. Moreover, we 
report the effect of the capital levy on the summary inequality measures, for which we display 
the relative change. We account for the entire capital levy burden in relation to the existing 
net wealth. The Gini coefficient, which is known to be sensitive to changes at the middle of 
the distribution, increases only a little due to higher allowances. The top-sensitive GE(2) 
measure indicates a much stronger reduction in wealth inequality, which markedly increases 
with higher allowances. Also the specific reliefs for business property reduce the wealth in-
come inequality more than the respective scenarios without such reliefs. Obviously, the per-
sons with lower business property and net wealth benefit relatively more from this relief.  
The costs of tax assessment strongly depend on the number of taxpayers. This is especially 
true for the compliance costs of taxpayers and the administrative costs of tax authorities. Rais-
ing the fixed revenue target from a significantly smaller number of taxpayers would reduce 
the assessment effort. The total cost share for compliance and administration makes up around 
5 percent of tax revenue for the scenarios with the low personal allowance, and decrease to 
below 1 percent for the scenarios with the high personal allowance. The picture is less clear 
regarding the estimated revenue loss resulting from valuation corrections for real estate prop-
erty. On the one hand, the share of real estate in total wealth declines with higher personal 
allowances, which would reduce the impact of the valuation corrections. On the other hand, 
higher allowances require higher tax rates in order to raise the targeted revenue amount, thus 
increasing the taxpayers’ incentives of to appeal against assessments, which we model in our 
simulations. On balance, the total costs slightly decline with higher personal allowances.  
At the bottom of Table 3, we also report the tax rates that result from a simulation that uses 
only SOEP data, without imputed top wealth concentration. Correspondingly, the tax rates 
would be much higher, in particular for the case of the high allowances.   19
6  Summary and Conclusion 
The idea of higher wealth taxes to finance the mounting public debt in the wake of the finan-
cial crises is gaining ground in several OECD countries. In this study, we evaluate the reve-
nue and distributional effects of a capital levy as proposed in the current German political 
debate. The levy aims at raising tax revenue of Euro 100 billion. Higher personal allowances 
would concentrate the tax burden on the wealthy part of the population.  
Our empirical analysis is based on household survey data from the 2007 wave of the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and microsimulation modeling. Since survey data do not rep-
resent the high end of wealth distribution well, we include information from a listing of the 
300 richest Germans, provided by manager magazin. Using the Pareto distribution, we esti-
mate the wealth distribution of persons owning net wealth of more than Euro 2 million and 
impute this distribution into the micro data base. The resulting aggregates on personal wealth 
are consistent with the stocks reported in the national and financial accounts statistics. Based 
on this data set, we built up a microsimulation model on wealth taxation. 
Our simulations show that wealth taxation could raise a substantial amount of revenue, even if 
higher personal allowances target the tax to those in the top percentiles of the wealth distribu-
tion, Yet, even if high personal allowances are set, the annual tax rates required to yield reve-
nues in the amount of Euro 100 billion, i.e., 4 percent of GDP, seem rather modest. For a per-
sonal allowance of Euro 1 million, which would confine the capital levy to the richest 0.6 
percent of the population, we estimate the annual tax rate to 0.65 percent, or 0.87 percent if 
special reliefs for business property are included. Moreover, raising the tax revenue from the 
top percentiles of the wealth distribution would reduce the costs of assessment. 
It should be noted that our empirical analysis includes several estimation risks. The standard 
error resulting from the sampling error of the survey data is rather large, in particular with 
respect to the high personal allowances. Further estimation risks emerge from the imputation 
strategy of the top wealth concentration that relies on the Pareto distribution, and from meas-
urement errors regarding the information on household wealth. In particular, it seems unclear 
if fiscal authorities can actually succeed in fully ascertaining and valuing taxable properties. 
Therefore, to be on the safe side of estimates for the tax base of the capital levy, we would 
recommend focusing on the lower bound of the confidence intervals reported. Corresponding-
ly, the tax rates required for the revenue target should be oriented towards the upper bound of 
the confidence intervals. For the scenario with a personal allowance of Euro 1 million this   20
would imply an annual tax rate of 1.14 percent, or 1.46 percent in the case of the special re-
liefs for business property.  
We have not analyzed further economic effects of the capital levy. As taxpayers could not 
anticipate it, no immediate substitution effects are involved in the short run. However, there 
will be long-term income and wealth effects. Savings or bequests and gifts might be adjusted 
to compensate the extra tax burden. In the case of real estate and business property, frustration 
with deficient valuation procedures could enhance political resistance against the levy. Li-
quidity constraints might cause problems, which could be addressed by tax reliefs or longer 
payment periods. In the long run, the impact on the behavior of the wealthy elite significantly 
depends upon if the levy is perceived as exceptional or not. Saving and investment might be 
discouraged if potential taxpayers expect that the capital levy will be repeated. Finally, as 
historical experience suggests, the feasibility of a capital levy would considerably depend on 
the attitude and perception of the wealthy elite with respect to the political exigency to resort 
to such an extraordinary fiscal policy measure. 
A fiscal instrument rather similar to a capital levy is a compulsory loan. Historically, govern-
ments with bad credit often resorted to using this instrument. It might be tempting to govern-
ments to combine both instruments in times of debt overhang, thus promising that the levy 
will be converted into loans once fiscal sustainability is regained. 
   21
Appendix 
Table A-1 Assets and liabilities of households in Germany according to national and financial 








Fixed assets 5 463   50.5   Loan and other liabilities
2) 1 530   14.1  
Dwellings 3 432   31.7   Consumer loans  198   1.8  
Land underlying buildings 1 483   13.7   Mortgage loans 1 037   9.6  
Other buildings  379   3.5   Entrepreneurial loans  286   2.6  
Land underlying other buildings  46   0.4   Other liabilities  9   0.1  
Other fixed assets
1)  124   1.1  
Financial assets
2) 4 424   40.9  
Currency and deposits 1 575   14.5  
Currency and transfer. deposits  630   5.8  
Savings deposits and certificates  945   8.7  
Mutual funds shares  508   4.7  
Claims on insurance corporations
3) 1 227   11.3  
   Short-term claims  81   0.7  
   Longer-term claims 1 146   10.6  
      with life insurance companies  718   6.6  
      with health insurance schemes  135   1.2  
      with pension funds  293   2.7   Net wealth 9 296   85.9  
Company pension commitments  255   2.4  
Securities  859   7.9  
   Bonds, money market papers  315   2.9  
   Shares  356   3.3  
   Other equity  188   1.7  
Consumer durables of households  939   8.7   7 242   66.9  
Total 10 826   100.0   Total 10 826   100.0  
Assets Liabilities
Net wealth less                       
consumer durables, company 
pension commitments, claims with 
health insurance schemes, 
currency and transferable deposits, 
consumer loans
1) Machinery and equipment, cultivated assets, and intangible fixed assets.- 2) Excluding non-profit institutions serving 
households.- 3) Including private pension funds as well as occupational pension schemes and supplementary pension funds, 
including accumulated interest-bearing surplus shares with insurance corporations.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office, national accounts; Deutsche Bundesbank, financial accounts.
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